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We propose a new model of minority game with so-called smart agents such that the standard
deviation σ2 and the total loss in this model reach the theoretical minimum values in the limit of long
time. The smart agents use trail and error method to make a choice but bring global optimization
to the system, which suggests that the economic systems may have the ability to self-organize into
a highly optimized state by agents who are forced to make decisions based on inductive thinking
for their limited knowledge and capabilities. When other kinds of agents are also present, the
experimental results and analyses show that the smart agent can gain profits from producers and
are much more competent than the noise traders and conventional agents in original minority game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game (MG) models was introduced by
Challet and Zhang in 1997 as a model for the competi-
tion for limited resources[1], which have attracted much
attention in recent years. The basic scenario is easy to
explain: there is a population of N players who, at each
time step, have to choose either 0 or 1. Those who are
in the minority win, the other lose (to avoid ambiguities,
N is chosen to be odd). The agents make their decisions
based on the most recent m outcomes, thus there are
2m different histories. A strategy is defined as a table
of 2m choices (either 0 or 1) for the 2m corresponding
histories, so that there are 22
m
different strategies in the
strategy-space. Each agent randomly picks s > 1 strate-
gies from the strategy-space in the beginning of the MG.
To each strategy is associated a integral point, which ini-
tially takes the value 0 and will increase by 1 at each time
step if it predicts the result correctly. Each agent uses
the one with the highest point among his s strategies, if
there are several strategies with the same highest point,
one of those will be chosen randomly. A very important
quantity in this model is the overall loss defined as
L(t) = Nloss(t)−Nwin(t) ≥ 1 (1)
where Nloss and Nwin are, respectively, the number of
losers and the winners at time t. Apparently, the smaller
L(t) is, the better the system performs. Another related
quantity is called the standard deviation and defined as
σ2(t) = (n0(t)− n¯)
2 (2)
where n0 is the number of agents who choose 0 and
n¯ = N/2. It is easy to see that σ2(t) = L2(t)/4 and
theoretically, the minimum value of σ2(t) is 0.25.
One of the focuses of scientists’ attention is the prob-
lem how to improve the performance of system, i.e.
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to reduce σ2. Recently, some new kinds of agent are
introduced[2, 3], by whom the overall performance of sys-
tem is improved. A farther question is whether it is pos-
sible to achieve the global optimization in the framework
of the MG model assuming that agents try to outsmart
each other for their selfish gain and act based on induc-
tive thinking[4].
Recently, a significant work is achieved by Reents, et al,
who propose a stochastic minority game model in which
σ2 is minimized[5]. In their model, an agent will not
change his choice in the next time step if he wins in the
present turn, by contraries, he will change his choice at
probability p. The value of p is the same for all the
agents. When p ≪ 1/N , Reents et al, found that σ2 ∼
0.25. However, the agents in real-life systems are not as
clever as Reents, they do not know how to select a value
of p, and even do not know the total number of agents N .
Thus Reents’s model may be not proper for the systems
consisting of agent with inductive thinking.
Metzler and Horn have introduced the evolution into
the stochastic minority game model[6]. Similarly to the
evolutionary minority game model[7], for an arbitrary
agent i, a probability pi(t) and a score si is equipped[8].
The score si increases by 1 if the agent wins and de-
creases by 1 if the agent loses. When si ≤ d < 0, the
agent is deceased and replaced by a new agent with a
reset score si = 0. If pi(t) of the new agent is randomly
distributed in (0, 1), the average value of pi(t) in the fi-
nal stationary state is found to be at the order of 1 and
thus σ2 ∼ O(N2). They also discussed the situation in
which the new agent chooses pi(t) by copying the value of
pj(t) of another agent who is randomly selected. Within
this scheme, it is possible to see that pi(t) ∼ O(1/N) and
σ2 ∼ 1 in sufficiently long time. However, it is still unrea-
sonable to assume that an agent knows the information
of all other agents. Furthermore, p is at the order of 1/N
and thus σ2 is greater than 0.25 in the final state. The
best solution is still not achieved in their model.
In the present paper, we propose a new model of mi-
nority game with so-called smart agents such that the
2standard deviation σ2 and the total loss in this model
reach the theoretical minimum values in the limit of long
time. The smart agents act based on inductive thinking
but bring global optimization to the system. Experimen-
tal results and analyses show that when other kinds of
agents are also present, the smart agent can gain profits
from producers and are much more competent than the
noise traders and conventional agents in original minority
game.
II. MODEL AND NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Our model consists of N agents with N an odd in-
teger. Each agent has only one strategy which evolves
with the following rule: suppose at a given time step
t, the memory (history) is µ and the strategy of the
i-th agent is si(t, ν) for ν = 0, ..., 2
M − 1. Also, each
agent has a probability function pi(t, ν) for i = 1, ..., N
and ν = 0, ..., 2M − 1. If the i-th agent wins at t, the
strategy will not be changed; contrarily, with probabil-
ity 1 − pi(t, µ), si(t, ν) is not changed, with probability
pi(t, µ), si(t+1, µ) = 1−si(t, µ), but si(t+1, ν) = si(t, ν)
for all other ν 6= µ.
The initial value of pi(t, ν) is randomly selected in (0, 1)
and evolves by self-teaching mechanism, which is the sim-
plest trail and error method. For a given time step t with
history µ, consider the last time step t′ when the memory
is also µ. If the agent i won at t′ or he loses but does not
change si(t
′, µ), then no changes will occur. Otherwise,
pi(t, µ) will change according to the following rule[9]:
pi(t+ 1, µ) =
{
min(1, 2pi(t, µ)) agent i wins at time t
pi(t, µ)/2 agent i loses at time t
(3)
No changes will occur for all pi(t, ν) with ν 6= µ.
Note that the evolution of pi(t, µ) for different mem-
ories is essentially decoupled in our model. Therefore,
mathematically speaking, the m 6= 0 case is a trivial
generalization of the m = 0 case. The reason why we in-
troduce different memories here is to mimic the behavior
of the agents in real-life markets that the agents study
the selection rules for different memories in order to find
some regularities.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results, which indicate
that the system will reach global optimization in suffi-
ciently long time. We have checked that the property of
time evolution of σ2(t) for the cases with more agents
and larger memory is the same as that of N = 101 and
m = 0, 1, 2.
Fig.2 presents the log-log plot for the time dependence
of G(t) =
∑N
i=1 pi(t) and H(t) =
∏N
i=1 pi(t) for N = 101
andm = 0, respectively. The results show that G(t) has a
power law dependence of time with the exponent γ ≈ −1
when t is large, which suggests that G(t) → 0(t → ∞),
thus it is reasonable to suppose pi(t) ≪ 1/N when t is
sufficiently large. In this case, at most one agent may
change the strategy at each time step (the probability
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FIG. 1: Time evolution of σ2(t) for N = 101 smart agents
with m =0 (a), 1 (b), and 2 (c). The value of σ2(t) shown in
this figure is the average of 10 independent experiments and
the horizontal line represents σ2 = 0.25.
for two or more agents changing their strategies at the
same time is negligibly small) thus the number of agents
on the majority side is always (N + 1)/2. Therefore, the
agent who changes the strategy is from the losing side to
the losing side and pi(t) is reduced by a factor of 2. Since
pi(t) ≪ 1/N , the probability that one agent will change
his strategy is
η = 1−
∏
i∈Wl(t)
(1− pi(t)) ≈
∑
i∈Wl(t)
pi(t) ≈
G(t)
2
where Wl(t) is the set of losers at time t. Then we have
the iterative equations for G(t) and H(t):
G(t+ 1) = η
2N − 1
2N
G(t) + (1− η)G(t) (4)
H(t+ 1) = η
H(t)
2
+ (1− η)H(t) (5)
According to Eq.(4)&(5), one can find that G(t) ∼ t−1
and H(t) ∼ t−N [10], which is consentaneous with the
simulation results shown in figure 2.
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FIG. 2: Time dependence of G(t) (a) and H(t) (b), where
N = 101 and m = 0. The slopes of the two curves in figure a
& b are −1.01(≈ −1) and −102(≈ −N), respectively.
III. SMART AGENTS IN MIXED MARKET
Challet et al classified the agents into three different
types[11]: producers who have only one strategy, spec-
ulators (conventional agents in original minority game)
who have two or more strategies, and the noise traders
who make their choices by random tosses. In this section,
we will investigate how smart agents perform in mixed
market[12].
Firstly, let us look into how the smart agents compete
with the producers. Assume that there are Np producers
and Ns smart agents with Np +Ns an odd integer, each
producer has only one fixed strategy. For simplicity, we
shall first discuss the case of m = 0. Suppose Np0 pro-
ducers always choose 0, and Np1 producers always choose
1. If ∆ = Np0−Np1 > Ns(< −Ns), then Ns smart agents
must choose 1(0) in the equilibrium state and win at each
time step. When Ns > ∆ > 0 (the case Ns > −∆ > 0 is
analogic), the situation is slightly complicated. From the
discussion in section 2, it is not difficult to see that the
overall loss of Np+Ns agents is minimized in the equilib-
rium state. Namely, there will be either (Ns −∆+ 1)/2
smart agents choosing 0 and (Ns+∆−1)/2 smart agents
choosing 1 or (Ns−∆−1)/2 smart agents choosing 0 and
(Ns + ∆ + 1)/2 smart agents choosing 1. In the former
case, the agents choosing 0 are losers, whiles in the latter
case, the agents choosing 0 are winners. The equilibrium
state is described by the transition between two cases.
Before it switches to another case, the equilibrium state
stays in one case for a period of time, called the life time.
The life times of two cases are different. Assume that
the probability pi of agent i is independent of i, then the
life time of the former case is τ1 = 2/(Ns −∆+ 1)〈p〉
and the latter case is τ2 = 2/(Ns +∆+ 1)〈p〉, where 〈p〉
denotes the average value of pi. The overall gain of the
smart agents at each time step is equal to
Σ =
1
τ1 + τ2
[(
Ns +∆− 1
2
−
Ns −∆+ 1
2
)τ1
+ (
Ns −∆− 1
2
−
Ns +∆+ 1
2
)τ2]
=
1
Ns + 1
[∆2 − 1−Ns] (6)
Therefore, Σ > 0 when ∆ < Ns < ∆
2 − 1. The average
profit gained by each smart agent at each time step is
Σ
Ns
=
1
Ns(Ns + 1)
[∆2 − 1−Ns] (7)
According to Eq.(7), when Ns < ∆
2 − 1, each smart
agent can gain profits from producers. Suppose the num-
ber of smart agent Ns is not fixed, if Ns < ∆
2 − 1, some
new smart agents, if available, will join the game since
they can gain profits from producers. Thus there will
be eventually Ns ≈ ∆
2 − 1 smart agents in the market,
whose profits are approximatively equal to 0 with slight
fluctuation. This process can be considered as an exam-
ple for the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which is
hotly controversial in the recent years[13]. But in real-life
financial market, the number of producers is alterable,
thus the equilibrium state can rarely be reached.
When m > 0, the number of possible histories is
2m > 1. For a given history µ, suppose Np0(µ) producers
always choose 0 and Np1(µ) producers always choose 1.
Then ∆(µ) = Np0(µ) − Np1(µ) is a function of µ. Since
different history µ is essentially decoupled in our model
and the number of smart agents Ns is fixed, there may
be three cases under history µ: (i) |∆(µ)| ≥ Ns, each
smart agent can gain one point at each time step; (ii)
∆2(µ)−1 > Ns > |∆(µ)|, the smart agents can averagely
gain profit from the producers; (iii) ∆2(µ)− 1 < Ns, the
smart agent cannot gain profit and are characterized by
the overall loss described by Eq.(1).
The above picture is confirmed by the numerical sim-
ulation result shown in Figure 3(a). One can find that
σ2 decreases as t increases and decays to 0.25 when t is
sufficiently large. Figure 3(b) plots the time dependence
of the mean gain for smart agents:
As(t) =
Nswin(t)−Nslose(t)
Ns
where Nswin and Nslose denote the number of smart
agents who win and lose, respectively. Initially, As(t)
is negative, but as t increases, As(t) becomes positive.
Therefore, the smart agents can gain profits from pro-
ducers in the regime ∆2(µ)− 1 > Ns.
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of σ2(t) (a) and As(t) (b), where
Np = 200, Ns = 801, m = 1 and ∆(0) = ∆(1) = 200. The
value of σ2(t) and As(t) shown in these two figures is the
average of 32 independent experiments and the horizontal line
in figure (a) represents σ2 = 0.25.
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FIG. 4: Time evolution of σ2(t) (a), As(t) (b), and An(t) (c),
where Ns = 801, Nn = 200 and m = 1.The value of σ
2(t),
As(t) and An(t) shown in these three figures is the average of
32 independent experiments and the horizontal line in figure
(a) represents σ2 = 0.25.
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of σ2(t) (a), As(t) (b), and Am(t) (c),
where Ns = 51, Nm = 50, m = 3 and the number of strategies
used by the conventional agents is 2. The value of σ2(t), As(t)
and Am(t) shown in these three figures is the average of 32
independent experiments and the horizontal line in figure (a)
represents σ2 = 0.25.
Secondly, let’s consider the case in which the noise
traders and smart agents are present. Assume that there
are Nn noise traders and Ns smart agents with Nn +Ns
an odd integer. Figure 4(a) plots the time dependence of
σ2, one can find that σ2 decreases as t increases, but does
not reach the theoretical Optimization 0.25 in the limit
of long time. This result is not difficult to understand for
the existence of noise traders will bring more fluctuations
into the system. Figure 4(b) and 4(c) exhibit the time
dependence of As and An respectively, where An is the
mean gain of noise traders:
An(t) =
Nnwin(t)−Nnlose(t)
Nn
Nnwin and Nnlose denote the number of the noise traders
who win and lose, respectively. Apparently, the smart
agents perform much better than the noise traders do.
At last, We have studied the case in which the conven-
tional agents, who take the actions based on the original
minority game model[1], and smart agents are present.
Assume that there are Ns smart agents and Nm con-
ventional agents with Ns + Nm an odd integer. Figure
5(a) shows the time dependence of σ2. One sees that
σ2 decreases with time but also does not reach the theo-
retical Optimization 0.25 in the limit of long time. This
result implies that the conventional agents also introduce
fluctuations, though its magnitude is less than the noise
5traders in this case, into the system. In figure 5(b) and
5(c), we report the time dependence of As and Am re-
spectively, where Am is the mean gain of conventional
agents:
Am(t) =
Nmwin(t)−Nnlose(t)
Nm
where Nmwin and Nmlose are the number of the conven-
tional agents who win and lose, respectively. From these
two figures, one immediately finds that the smart agents
perform much better than the conventional agents. This
is an evidence that it may be not reasonable to use the
conventional agents to mimic the actual traders in real-
life markets.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We propose a new model of minority game with so-
called smart agents, who use trail and error method to
make a choice. When only the smart agents are present,
it is found that the overall loss is minimized to the theo-
retical limit as σ2 → 0.25(t→∞). Notice that although
those smart agents are independent and only trying to do
their best for their selfish gain based on inductive think-
ing, the Global Optimization is achieved in our model.
The result suggests that the economic systems may have
the ability to self-organize into a highly optimized state
by agents who are forced to make decisions based on in-
ductive thinking for their limited knowledge and capabil-
ities.
In mixed market cases, when the model consists of the
smart agents and the producers with only one fixed strat-
egy, we have found that, under certain circumstances, the
smart agents can gain profit from the producers. Also,
the overall loss of the producers and the smart agents is
minimized. When the model consists of the smart agents
and the noise traders who choose the room randomly at
each round, it is found that the smart agents also cooper-
ate very well so that the overall loss of the smart agents
becomes very small when the time is sufficiently large.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that, the smarts agents
perform much better than the conventional agents in
mixed market. Imagine an agent trying to figure out
the regularity of the financial market. Assume at time
t1, he has the selection rules for all possible histories,
i.e., he has a strategy. At a later time t2, he finds that
the selection rules for some histories do not give profits.
Therefore, he may change the selection rule for these his-
tory, but not for the other histories which still give him
profits. This is in contrast with the original MG model in
which an agents selects the strategy with the highest vir-
tual point. When he changes the strategy, he may change
many selection rules although they still make profits. We
think that is the reason why the conventional agents are
less competent than smart agents.
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